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Abstract
Since 1979, China has experienced a widespread revival of religious faith and 
practice. This article aims to provide an overview of this phenomenon, by 
examining the causes behind it, the variety and popularity of religions and 
the different profi les of believers. It suggests that China's religions are diverse, 
encompassing offi cial, unoffi cial, and folk religions, and that the revival is 
signifi cant and visible. According to offi cial statistics, the fi ve largest religions 
in 2003 counted 144 million believers, while the non-offi cial sources give the 
fi gure as nearer 200 million. The revival has been fuelled by a number of fac-
tors: the state's lifting of the ban to freedom of worship; popular disillusion 
with the offi cial ideology; economic and social uncertainties in the wake of 
economic reforms and modernization; and the enduring resilience of religion 
and tradition. For ethnic minorities like Uighurs and Tibetans, the revival of 
their religion has been accompanied by a similar cultural renaissance. Bud-
dhists and Daoists among the Han in Hubei Province come from a wide range 
of educational backgrounds and professions, although the majority of them 
are women or were born before 1956. The Han Buddhists and Daoists turn to 
religion primarily for practical reasons, that is, to gain some advantage in their 
earthly lives rather than looking for rewards in the afterlife. For this reason, 
religious fundamentalism may have limited appeal to the Han Chinese.
China's religions experienced a transformation in the post-1979 era, as 
evidenced by an increase in the number of places of worship as well as 
the rise of unoffi cial religions. This article seeks to provide an overview 
of religious revival in China, including its scope, variety, and causes. 
It suggests that China's religions are diverse, encompassing offi cial, 
unoffi cial, underground, and folk religions, and that their revival is 
signifi cant and visible. The revival has been fuelled by a number of fac-
tors: the state's lifting of its ban on freedom of worship; by widespread 
disillusion with the offi cial ideology; economic and social uncertainties 
in the wake of modernization and reforms; and the enduring nature 
of religious belief. Data from one province reveal that Han Buddhists 
and Daoists come from a wide range of educational backgrounds and 
professions. The majority of them are females or were born before 1956. 
Introduction
Introduction
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The Chinese Han, especially Buddhists and Daoists, turn to religion 
primarily for utilitarian reasons, that is, to seek benefi ts in their earthly 
life, rather than looking for rewards in an afterlife. 
This article will review religions that attract the largest numbers of 
followers but which have drawn far less attention in the West.1 They 
include Mahayana Buddhism and a variety of folk religions. It will also 
survey Tibetan Buddhism, underground Catholicism and Protestant-
ism, and Falun Gong, which has recently come under the spotlight in 
the US and European media, in Western policy-making, and even aca-
demic circles. As far as Tibetans and Uighurs are concerned, religion 
has remained an inherent part of their culture and life, and the state's 
relaxed policies have helped to aid the revival of religion as well as their 
cultural heritage.
Different Religions in China
This article adopts the following defi nition of religion: 
Religion is a set of beliefs, symbols and practices based on the notion of supernatural 
forces and in some cases, an afterlife, and which unites believers in a socio-religious 
community.2
This broad defi nition incorporates folk religions that are peculiar to 
China, plus the fi ve main religions.3 Following recent studies on Chi-
na's religions,4 this article leaves out Confucianism from the discussion, 
largely because in present-day China it exists primarily in the form of 
ethical teachings, rather than religion per se. Rarely is Confucius wor-
shipped in China today, nor is Confucianism viewed as a religion. 
As Liu and Leung persuasively demonstrate, the growth and revival 
of the Catholic Church in China is deeply shaped by its relationship 
with the state as well as its indigenization (Liu and Leung 2002: 121-38). 
Furthermore, political constraints on religious activities persist despite 
relaxed governmental policies. 
In a similar vein, Myron L. Cohen categorized Chinese religions into 
three categories, namely: offi cial, heterodoxy, and popular. Following 
Cohen's methodology, for the purposes of this article and to facilitate 
the discussion (as Table 1 indicates), three types of religion in China will 
be discussed (Cohen 1992: 17-31). 
1.    The fi ve big, offi cially recognized religions, namely, Buddhism, 
Daoism, Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism. These religions 
enjoy relatively well-demarcated places of worship and open and 
publicized nationwide associations. 
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2.    Unoffi cial religions, comprising underground churches, sects 
related to the big fi ve yet not recognized by the state, and Tibetan 
Buddhists and Xinjiang Muslims who challenge Beijing's control. 
Within this category, there are three subgroups: 
• The clergy and followers in the underground Protestant and 
Catholic churches make up the unoffi cial Protestant and Catho-
lic gatherings. A signifi cant number of believers prefer to at-
tend the unoffi cial underground churches, which they see as 
independent from any government interference. 
• Booming alongside these underground churches are unof-
fi cial sects. Their doctrines resemble the fi ve main religions, 
yet their teachings and practices may differ from those of the 
big fi ve. Some choose to maintain a low profi le in order not to 
invite a government crackdown. Others, such as Falun Gong, 
choose instead to confront the state and assert publicly their 
organizational independence. 
• Lastly, a number of Tibetan Buddhists and Xinjiang Muslims
ignore or challenge the state's control and support independ-
ence of their regions. 
3.    Indigenous religions, or folk religions. Folk religions come in var-
ied and diffused forms, including utilitarian ancestor or lineage 
worship (worshipping one's ancestors so that the ancestor's soul can 
intervene on behalf of its living descendants), local god worship, 
divination, geomancy (most notably fengshui), witchcraft (sorcery, 
exorcism and planchette writing), physiognomy, and certain taboos.5
Many of the folk religions tend to vary across regions, and their 
followers generally believe in several at any one time. 
There have been a limited number of studies on religions in post-
Mao China, but the number is growing. Most of these studies focus on 
Protestantism, Catholicism, Islam and folk religions in China. A few 
studies also survey offi cial policies and religious practices in China. 
These studies enrich our understanding of the state's regulations, its 
operation of religious institutions, and the views and practice of religious 
professionals. As many of these studies are anthropologically oriented 
and based on fi eldwork, they reveal much of the interaction on the one 
hand between these institutions and their followers and, on the other, 
between religion and the local political structure.
Nevertheless, these studies have noticeable limitations. First, few of 
them provide sound data on the popularity of all the fi ve religions as 
well as folk religions. While there is some analysis of the number of
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followers of Islam, Protestantism and Catholics, yet discussion on the 
number of followers of Daoism and the most popular Buddhism and 
folk religions is scant. Furthermore, many studies fail to take account of 
changes in the number of places of worship over the past two decades 
and the main religions among the different ethnic groups in China.6
Second, there is a lack of systemic analyses backed by data on why the 
Chinese have turned to religion in the post-Mao era. Third, we have yet 
to know who exactly the religious Chinese are and what sort of profi le 
they have. We thus remain unsure about why the Chinese embrace 
religion and who the religious followers are.
TABLE 1: Types of Religion in China and the Ethnicity of Followers
Followers Offi cial Religions Unoffi cial 
Religions
Folk Religions
Han
Mahayana Buddhism
Daoism
Protestantism
Catholicism 
Unoffi cial sects: 
Falun Gong, 
Zhong Gong, 
Zhusheng Jiao, 
etc.
Ancestor worship, local god 
worship, geomancy (Feng 
Shui, etc.), fortune-telling 
(divination, or through read-
ing birth statistics, faces, and 
palms), witchcraft and taboos
Ethnic 
Minorities
1. Islam: 10 minorities – 
Hui, Uygurs, Kazak, 
Dongxiang, Kirgiz, Salar, 
Tajik, Uzbek, Bonan and 
Tatar
2. Tibetan Buddhism: Five 
minorities – Tibetans, 
Mongolians, Menba, Tu 
and Yugur
3. Mahayana Buddhism: 
Two minorities – Kore-
ans and Bai
4. Theravada (Hinayana) 
Buddhism: Three mi-
norities – Blang, Dai and 
De'ang 
5. Shamanism: Six minori-
ties – Daur, Ewenki, 
Hezhen, Manchu, Oren-
qen and Xibo
6. Daoism: Three minorities 
– Monan, Mulao and Yao 
7. Orthodoxy: Russians
Pro-independence 
Tibetan Buddhists 
and Xinjiang 
Muslims 
Various primitive religions: 
25 minorities – Achang, 
Bouyei, Dong, Dulong, 
Gaoshan, Gelao, Hani, Jing, 
Jingpo, Jino, Lahu, Luoba, Li, 
Lisu, Miao, Naxi, Nu, Primi, 
Qiang, She, Shui, Tujia, Va, Yi 
and Zhuang
Mixed 
Ethnicities
Protestantism, Catholicism Underground 
churches; unof-
fi cial sects
Note: The table lists one main religion for each of the minorities, and leaves out, due to limited 
space, their minor religions.
Source: Du et al. (eds) 1994: 449-52.
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25 million Protestants, and 10 million Catholics. According to non-offi cial
estimates, the number of followers of the fi ve main religions (Buddhism, 
Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism and Daoism) in 2003 reached around 
200 million, or over 15 percent of the population (see Table 2). 
TABLE 2: Offi cial and Non-offi cial Estimates of Believers (millions)
Religions Offi cial, 1999 Offi cial, 2003 Non-offi cial, 2003
Mahayana Buddhism 
(Han)
90.5 90.5 132.7*
Tibetan Buddhism 7.5 7.6 7.6
Theravada Buddhism 
(Yunnan)
2.0 1.5 1.5
Daoism 3.0 3.0 3.0
Islam 19.0 20.3 20.0
Protestantism 15.0 16.0 25.0
Catholicism 4.0 5.0 10.0
Total 141.0 143.9 199.8
Sources: Offi cial data on 1999 come mainly from 'Zhongguo zongjiao yanjiu zhongxi wenzhang 
toulu: Zhongguo xianyou gezhong zongjiao xintu yiyi duoren' [Paper from China Religious 
Research Center Reveals: China Has over One Hundred Million Followers of Various Religions] 
2003; Editorial Department of China's Religions 2000:30. Offi cial data on 2003 come from 
'Zongjiao tuanti' [Religious Groups] 2003. Data on Mahayana Buddhists comes partly from 
Argue et al. (2000). Non-offi cial data on followers of Islam, Protestantism and Catholicism in 
2003 (Gladney 2003: 451; Madsen 2003: 469; Bays 2003: 491). Non-offi cial data on followers of 
Tibetan Buddhism and Theravada Buddhism in Yunnan are considered offi cial data, because 
non-offi cial data are unavailable. 
Note: * Extrapolated data based on the offi cial data in 1999, using the averaged offi cial growth 
rates of those of Protestantism and Catholicism between 1999 and 2003.
These numbers should be treated with caution though for the fol-
lowing reasons. First, it is diffi cult to distinguish actual practitioners 
from self-proclaimed believers. Second, even though the state permits 
religious activities, it refuses to endorse them, and even openly promotes 
atheism. Therefore, many religious activities take place covertly, so it 
becomes problematic to estimate the numbers of followers of unoffi cial 
religions and sects. The offi cial statistic of 144 million followers in 2003 
for the fi ve religions can only give us a very rough guide to the current 
status of religion in the country. 
The case of Hubei Province sheds light on the popularity of reli-
gion over the past few decades. Information on the province has been 
published jointly by a Professor of Theology at the leading provincial 
university and a Deputy Secretary General of the provincial legislature, 
who had ready access to both religious survey data and internal gov-
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ernmental data. Since Hubei is at a medium level of socio-economic 
development among the 31 provinces in China, it can be regarded as 
an average Chinese province. In the early 1980s religion was still on 
the wane as a result of devastation caused by the Cultural Revolution 
of 1966.8 After the late 1980s, religious groups expanded, as refl ected 
in the rise of Buddhist and Daoist followers in Hubei (see Table 3), and 
this was matched by a similar trend nationwide. The numbers of places 
of religious worship nationwide for all the fi ve mainstream religions, 
especially Daoism, Buddhism (among the Hans), Protestantism and 
Catholicism rose rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s (see Table 4). By the late 
1990s, the number of religious centres and churches established by the 
fi ve main religions nationwide rivalled the period immediately after the 
Chinese Communists came to power. Religious places of worship include 
churches, monasteries, mosques and make-shift meeting places. They 
totalled over 100,000 in 2003. In addition, the number of clerics of the 
fi ve religions also expanded, reaching 300,000 in 2003 (see Table 5).
In Table 5, Buddhist and Daoist meeting places are fewer than those 
of other religions for two reasons. First, the number of Buddhist and 
Daoist temples may be under-estimated. In Hubei in the 1990s, for 
example, only 476 Buddhist and 206 Daoist temples were registered, 
TABLE 3: Number of Buddhists and Daoists in Hubei Province
Year Buddhists Daoists
1966 98,000 65,300
1982 93,000 46,000
1996 800,000 300,000
Source: Gong and Zhou 1999.
TABLE 4: Places of Worship and Religious Meeting Places in China
Period Meeting Sites
Early years of Communist rule 120,000
Late 1980s 40,000
1992 60,000
Late 1990s 100,000
2003 100,000
Sources: Zhu 1994; He 1999; 'Zongjiao tuanti' [Religious Groups] 2003. 
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TABLE 5:  Number of Offi cial Religious Clerics, Places of Worship, 
and Religious Colleges around 2003
Religions No. of Clerics Places of 
Worship
Religious 
Schools/Colleges
Mahayana Buddhism 
(Han)
  70,000 9,000 14
Tibetan Buddhism 120,000 3,000 4
Theravada Buddhism 
(Yunnan)
 10,000 1,600 1
Daoism  25,000 1,500 4
Islam  45,000 35,000 10
Protestantism  20,000 37,000 18
Catholicism   4,000 5,000 36
Total 294,000 92,100 87
Total (offi cial source) 300,000 100,000 74
Sources: 'Zongjiao tuanti' [Religious Groups] 2003; data on Daoist and Islamic religious schools 
(Wang 2003); 'Bentai dui Zhongguo Yisilanjiao Xiehui fuhuizhang Xiamusi Ding de caifang shilu' 
[Interview by Our Station of Xiamusi Ding, Vice Director of China Islamic Association] 2003.
whereas 2,067 Buddhist and Daoist temples were not. Second, one Bud-
dhist or Daoist temple can serve many more followers than one site of 
other religions.
In the post-Mao period, the state revived the offi cial associations of 
the fi ve religions, which were set up in the 1950s and then abolished 
during the Cultural Revolution. Offi cial associations play a dual role 
in mediating the relations between the state and religion. On the one 
hand, they help the state to implement offi cial religious policies and 
manage local religious organizations, for example, by setting the number 
of Buddhist temples to be opened and by preventing religious groups 
and believers from stepping outside the offi cial lines. In this sense, the 
associations serve as the enforcers of state rules (MacInnis 1989: 147). 
On the other hand, they voice the concerns (like local offi cials' infringe-
ment on religious freedom) to governmental agencies and top leaders for 
their religious groups and the believers. Offi cial religious associations 
also endeavour to promote the religion they represent. For example, 
by 1999 the offi cial Protestant association had printed 25 million copies 
of bibles and 10 million copies of hymnals, set up 18 seminaries, trained 
3,800 graduates and were publishing 100,000 copies of Tianfeng (a monthly 
journal), (Liaowang [Outlook], 1999 (21): 23-27).
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Unoffi cial Religions
Underground Catholic Church 
The centralized Chinese state has had a long history of confl ict with 
the Catholic Church. An early example is the rites controversy between 
1640 and 1742. The controversy resulted, on the one hand, in the Pope's 
edict that Catholic missionaries should forbid the practice of Chinese 
rites and, on the other hand, the Qing Emperor's expulsion of the Jesuits 
from China, which lasted for about 100 years. Antagonism between the 
Vatican and the Chinese Communists erupted during the Chinese civil 
war, resulting in the uneasy development of Catholicism in China in 
the following decades. In the 1950s, the CCP encouraged a Three-self 
Movement in order to sever the Catholic Church's ties with the Vatican. 
It arrested pro-Vatican bishops, priests and nuns, and drove pro-Vatican 
Catholics underground. The Vatican, in return, has been rejecting arch-
bishop and bishop appointments by the Chinese offi cial church and has 
offi cially recognized Taiwan instead of the People's Republic. 
The underground church consecrates new bishops, ordains priests, 
organizes national episcopal conferences and secures the Vatican's au-
thorization. Some elements of the underground church may be more 
confrontational toward the state than Rome would expect them to be 
(Hunter and Chan 1993: 241; Gong and Zhou 1999: 73). An estimate 
placed the number of offi cial bishops in 1995 at 70, and that of the un-
derground bishops at 60 (Mainland China Commission, 1996: 89). The 
underground Catholic Church appears to have attracted more followers 
than the offi cial church by the early 1990s. The underground church 
exists mainly in the rural area of Hebei, Shaanxi, Guangxi, Gansu and 
Xinjiang. It was estimated that in the early 1990s only one-fi fth or less 
of the total number of Catholics attended the offi cial church, and that 
in some provinces the underground church attracted twice as many 
followers as the offi cial one. However, the offi cial church has managed 
to reverse this trend in recent years. Many underground Catholics now 
also attend the offi cial church (Hunter and Chan 1989: 236-41; Chan 
1994: 19,13-14; Mainland China Commission 1996: 82-89; Liu and Leung 
2002: 126; personal communication with offi cials from China's Bureau 
of Religious Affairs of the State Council in March 2002). 
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Independent Protestant Church
During the Cultural Revolution, some Christians kept their faith by 
attending the secret 'house churches'. Like the underground Catholic 
Church, the independent church operates without the state's authoriza-
tion, sometimes even overtly. The independent church exists for three 
reasons. First, some Protestants regard the Three-Self Patriotic Move-
ment (TSPM) – the offi cial Protestant church – as having compromised 
too much vis-à-vis the atheist state, and therefore they refuse to acknowl-
edge it. Second, believers persecuted by the state during the late-Mao era 
are reluctant to join the state-sanctioned church. Many Christians still 
widely despise the TSPM's cooperation with the high-handed state in the 
1950s at denunciation meetings and thought reforms. Third, the sparse 
geographical distribution of the buildings of the offi cial church (partly 
due to the government's cap on new church buildings) also encourages 
the congregation to assemble at a nearby building of the independent 
church. Retired and devout believers who want to pray more often fi nd 
house churches suit their needs best. The state restricts and occasionally 
cracks down on these two underground churches (Hunter and Chan 
1993: 81-88; Chan 1995; Mainland China Commission 1996: 89).
Unoffi cial Sects
Unoffi cial sects differ in their preaching and practice from the fi ve of-
fi cial religions, and they also try to avoid the state's control. These sects 
have multiplied in post-Mao China. In Hunan Province alone, nearly 
10,000 of these sects were eradicated in the course of fi ve government 
campaigns in the 1990s. These included unoffi cial Christian sects, such 
as Lingling Jiao [Oriental Lightning], Zhushen Jiao [Religion of the Main 
God], as well as unoffi cial Buddhist, Daoist, and folk-religious sects, 
such as Buddhist-like Falun Gong, Guanyi Famen, Daoist Yiguan Dao, 
and probably qigong-based Zhong Gong (claiming 38 million followers 
at its peak, with an extensive business network and under the leader-
ship of Zhang Hongbao). 
The state has viewed these sects with suspicion and has at times 
cracked down on them. For example, Falun Gong and Zhong Gong 
have been banned, and their founders placed on the government's 
wanted lists. The state is wary of the organizational independence and 
secrecy of these unoffi cial sects, their apocalyptical appeals, the chal-
lenges they pose to the Party, as well as their foreign ties. Reportedly, 
the unoffi cial sects the state has suppressed share most of the following 
characteristics: 
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•     secretive activities and elaborate organizations; 
•     personality cult of the sect leader; 
•     preaching about doomsday; 
•     tight control of their members; 
•     mysticism and claimed supernatural abilities of the sect; 
•     independence of the CCP, or even hostility toward it; 
•     condemnation of offi cial religious associations and the offi cial church 
(such as the TSPM); and 
•     links with the West, Taiwan, South Korea, and other overseas places 
(Cao 1999: 29-30; Tan and Kong 2000: 28-30).
Falun Gong as an Unoffi cial Sect
As an unoffi cial sect attracting the international limelight in recent years, 
Falun Gong deserves a brief discussion here. Falun Gong is based on 
an unoffi cial and exclusive theology and boasts an extensive organi-
zational network. Founded by Li Hongzhi, Falun Gong fuses Daoist 
meditation and Buddhist doctrines. Li preaches about an apocalypse (mo 
jie),9 encourages mystic and inward-directed development of the self, 
and attracts followers by claiming his and his followers' 'supernatural' 
abilities. Li preaches truthfulness, benevolence and forbearance as the 
core principles of Falun Gong, and promotes personal cultivation of 
virtues and supernatural abilities through meditation and practice. He 
condemns the corrupting infl uence of the capitalist system, claims to 
know about a higher truth, and demands a high standard of morality 
(Shue 2001). Falun Gong practice provided millions of anxious, insecure, 
and ill followers with spiritual peace and medical relief (Li 1994; Liu 
1999; Liu 2000: 103-34; Wong 1999).
Falun Gong's large nationwide organization operated at four levels, 
namely, national, provincial, local, and grassroots levels. At the top level 
was its headquarters, established in Beijing in 1992. At the grassroots 
level were 28,000 sites where it was practised. As the overall leader, Li 
was able to quickly issue instructions through telecommunications (in-
cluding e-mails) to each level. Many national, provincial and local cadres 
and offi cials became followers, and even supplied inside information 
regarding the government's policies toward the sect. 
Under close scrutiny, Falun Gong may have propagated itself through 
means that contradict its own axioms. Li reportedly altered his birthday 
to that of Buddha in order to claim himself as the new saviour. He also 
proclaims that he and his master set the lifespan for the earth and that 
he could postpone an imminent explosion of the earth. Li claims to have 
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supernatural abilities, even though his mother, neighbours, colleagues, 
and even he himself privately deny their existence. Li has accumulated 
a large amount of wealth yet has evaded income tax (Hua and Zhong 
1999: 132, 99-101, 148-56). 
Li and his followers staged a dozen mass protests in front of govern-
ment offi ces, newspaper offi ces, and TV stations to challenge criticisms 
by the local media, scientists and sceptics (Wong 1999: 8, 11). Since 1999, 
the confl ict between Falun Gong and the state has intensifi ed. In April 
1999, over 10,000 Falun Gong followers caught the state off-guard by 
staging a peaceful protest and surrounding Zhongnanhai in Beijing, the 
Chinese White House. This event demonstrated to the state Falun Gong's 
extensive mobilizational capacity. Chinese leaders were well aware of 
large-scale rebellions led by religious sects or followers in China in recent 
centuries. Between the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries, 
the Qing empire was rocked by large rebellions led by the White Lotus 
Sect and the Heavenly Principles Sect. In the mid-nineteenth century 
the Taiping Rebellion destabilized the Qing Dynasty. Hong Xiuquan, the 
leading rebel, was a proclaimed Christian follower who claimed to have 
received a message from God. Chinese leaders, especially the top leader 
Jiang Zemin, soon learned and worried about Falun Gong's infi ltration 
into the Party and government, its large following, and its potential to 
rally the support of millions of discontented people into nationwide 
mass protests.10 In July 1999, the state declared Falun Gong an evil cult 
and outlawed it; key organizers were arrested soon afterwards. 
Since then, Falun Gong followers have been engaged in a war of attri-
tion with the state, yet have seen their infl uence waning. Occasionally 
small groups of Falun Gong followers protest in and outside mainland 
China, including staging publicly disruptive acts. Most of these pro-
testers in mainland China have been quickly arrested. By August 2000, 
at least 151 Falun Gong followers had been convicted of leaking state 
secrets, creating chaos, or other crimes (Human Rights Watch 2001). In 
early 2001, several Falun Gong followers, in response to Li's call for ac-
tion, set themselves on fi re in protests at Tiananmen Square. The offi cial 
media quickly used the footage of these acts as sensational material to 
portray Falun Gong as a suicidal and evil cult to the general public. Since 
then, Falun Gong has staged several acts in public defi ance of the state. 
During May and June 2001, Falun Gong followers used timed radio 
devices to broadcast publicly in ten provinces Li Hongzhi's preaching 
and his organization's precepts. These followers were soon arrested. 
In 14 July, Falun Gong followers who had been imprisoned in Harbin 
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attempted to commit suicide, and the authority rescued all but three. 
The state blamed overseas followers for instigating the event. After the 
11 September attacks in the US, Communist Party leaders even accused 
some Falun Gong followers of committing terrorist acts (South China 
Morning Post, 14 December, 2001). In November 2001, 35 Falun Gong 
followers from ten Western countries (including the US, Canada, Ger-
many and Australia) staged a protest in Tiananmen Square and were 
expelled from China. In the fi rst half of 2002, Falun Gong followers on 
several occasions disrupted cable and satellite TV programs in China 
and aired Falun Gong messages, one of which occurred during the World 
Cup Championship Game broadcasts ('Qiongtu molu de aiming' [Wails 
in Despair], 2001; South China Morning Post, 21 November 2001;  South 
China Morning Post, 14 December 2001; 'A Record of China's Xinnuo 
Satellite Attacked by Falun Gong's Illegal Signals,' 2002).
Religious Revival and Movements in Tibet and Xinjiang
Religion has been an intrinsic part of the culture and tradition of a number 
of ethnic minorities. The largest and most visible ethnic groups comprise 
Tibetans and Uighurs. Tibetan Buddhism has pervaded Tibetan daily 
life for centuries and many Tibetans see the Dalai Lama, their supreme 
religious leader, as their spiritual leader. Uighurs in Xinjiang accepted 
Islam as their faith hundreds of years ago and Imams wield signifi cant 
infl uence on their lives. Religion is also an underlying factor in the move-
ments of independence of Tibet and Xinjiang from China's rule. 11
The Cultural Revolution devastated Buddhism in Tibet, as in other 
provinces in China. With relaxed control in the post-Mao period, Tibetans 
revived their religious beliefs and traditions. As Beijing's liberal leaders, 
such as Hu Yaobang, relaxed control in the 1980s, Tibetans demanded 
greater autonomy, for example, by claiming Tibetan as their offi cial 
language. Their drive toward greater social freedom posed a direct 
challenge to the authority of the Party and Beijing. Unemployed urban 
Tibetans were unhappy with competition from Han people in Tibet; 
while monks and nuns, along with conservatives and traditionalists, 
despised secular developments in the wake of reform. Some radical 
Tibetans played down the central government's generous subsidies 
and blamed the backwardness of Tibet solely on the Communist rule; 
these groups supported the independence of Tibet. In addition, exiled 
Tibetans tried to exert their political infl uence in Tibet in various ways, 
including disseminating their political views during visits to Tibet, 
which tended to attract Beijing's suspicion. In the 1980s, many Tibetan 
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intellectuals and offi cials objected to radical movements that would 
derail gradualist reform and liberalization in Tibet. Nevertheless, other 
elites tolerated radicals in order to enhance their position vis-à-vis the 
central government and to obtain more subsidies (Shakya 1999: 419-21; 
Xu 1999: 147-61). 
The pro-independence movement grew and took to the streets in the 
October 1987, March 1988, March 1989 and May 1993. In the fi rst three 
protests, the police opened fi re on the Tibetan protesters, who were shout-
ing slogans for Tibetan independence and throwing rocks at the police, 
resulting in six to sixteen deaths in each incident (Xu 1999: 147-61).
In Xinjiang, Muslims total over 10 million, which is equivalent to 60 
percent of the population and 95 percent of the religious followers in the 
province. Muslims worship at most of the 24,000 mosques in Xinjiang. 
Pan-Islam gained initial support in Xinjiang in the 1930s, and seems 
to have undergone something of a revival with the rise of post-Soviet 
Central Asian countries, the support from several Middle Eastern Mus-
lim countries, and recently, the NATO intervention in Kosovo. To sup-
porters of full autonomy and even independence for Xinjiang, Beijing's 
policy of promoting economic development is merely a facade to erode 
the Uygur culture and Muslim beliefs. Resentment over competition 
from the Hans also provided the potential for schism among the ethnic 
minorities (Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 April 2000: 25; Ming Bao, 2 
September 1999; South China Morning Post, 28 August 2000; Mackerras 
1994: 194-96; Becquelin 2000: 65-90). Uighurs are also unhappy with 
Beijing's restriction of their religious activities as well as their lack of 
political power. Former Mujaheddin fi ghters in Afghanistan might have 
aided militancy in Xinjiang (Lufti 2002: 204-05). 
Many independence advocates in Xinjiang operate under the banner 
of Islam. Working as religious clerics, they condemn the CCP and the 
government, interpret the Koran as advocating an Islamic state and mili-
tant jihad, and propose independence as the best way to preserve local 
cultures. Chinese offi cial sources suggest that explosions, assassinations, 
and other violent acts in the 1990s totalled a few thousand, and that in 
1998 alone, over 70 serious incidents occurred, resulting in more than 380 
deaths (Becquelin 2000: 87). Southern Xinjiang (such as Kashi), where the 
population is overwhelmingly non-Han and Muslim and where unem-
ployment and economic underdevelopment are severe, as well as Yining, 
the former capital of East Turkestan, may be hotbeds of the separatist 
movement (Becquelin 2000: 65-90; Ming Bao, 3 November 2001).
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The state has suppressed religious separatism in Tibet and especially 
Xinjiang. Since the 11 September attacks in the US, Beijing has stressed 
that violent Muslim radicals constitute a terrorist threat in China and 
has stepped up its crackdown.12
Folk Religions
Scholars have long documented Chinese folk religions.13 Folk religions 
quickly regained their popularity in the countryside in the 1980s, as sug-
gested by anecdotal evidence. As early as 1982, peasants in Chuansha 
County in suburban Shanghai fl ocked to visit fortune-tellers at a fee, and 
were willing to pay a sorceress large sums of money for cures to their 
diseases. In 1986 in a market town in Guangdong Province, a total of 
393 ancestor halls were erected. Locals there regularly worshipped the 
spirits of ancestors in order to bring good luck to their living descend-
ants. In 1988, in a village in Sichuan, ancestor worship took place during 
the holidays, and religious rites were performed at funerals (MacInnis 
1989: 387-89, 368, 373, 395, 394).14
A survey (summarized in Table 6) provides circumstantial evidence 
for the extent of the popularity of folk religions. Of all the respondents, 
more than 41 percent believed totally or partially in some form of su-
perstition, and more than 38 percent had at one time participated in 
such rituals; 19 percent had done both. Folk religions have become very 
popular in rural areas where most Chinese live, resulting in a marked 
rise in the number of new temples being built and a boom in sales of 
manuals and books on folk religions. As followers of folk religions may 
account for 19 percent of the population, as noted above, and as many 
of these followers may also belong to one of the 'big fi ve' religions, one 
may assume that one-fi fth of all the Chinese in the mainland accept 
some form of religious faith. 
Profi le of Religious Followers
In 1997, the People's Political Consultative Conference of Hubei Province 
conducted a survey on 1,160 Buddhists and Daoists in 26 townships 
within 12 cities, counties and municipal districts. This appears to con-
stitute the only published data on the background of religious followers 
in China. Given Hubei's medium level of socio-economic development 
in China, it can be regarded as a representative Chinese province. In ad-
dition, as the above-mentioned statistics on religious followers suggest, 
Buddhists and Daoists constitute the majority of believers of the fi ve 
major religions in China, especially among the Han. The same is true 
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for Chinese societies in Taiwan and Hong Kong. Therefore, these data 
can be illuminating. Data on Buddhists and Daoists in Hubei in 1997 
(see Figure 2) suggest the following profi le: 
1.    The majority (65.3 percent) were born before 1957 and grew up (or 
were growing up) before the CCP's prohibition of religions of 1966-
78. Those who were born between 1957 and 1967 accounted for 14 
percent, those between 1967 and 1979 for 19 percent, and those after 
1979 for merely 2.2 percent.  
2.    The educational background of believers was diverse. Among the 
Buddhists and Daoists, 29 percent were college graduates, 20 percent 
left after high-school, 29 percent left after primary school, while 22 
percent were illiterate.
3.    Females (63 percent) accounted for the majority of the believers. 
4.    Believers were more or less representative of professions among the 
population, with peasants and workers making up 60 percent of the 
believers, and other professions 29 percent. Even though many cadres 
and teachers were Party members, and even though the Party prohib-
ited its members from believing in religion, cadres and teachers still 
made up 11 percent of the believers (Gong and Zhou 1999: 71).15
TABLE 6:  Chinese Involvement in Superstitious Beliefs, 1990
Attitudes and Participation % of All Respond-
ents
Believe or partially believe 41.4
Have participated 38.3
Believe, or partially believe, and have participated 19.4
Breakdown of the answers:
Do not believe and have not participated 38.0
Do not believe but have participated 18.9
Believe to some extent and have participated 15.7
Believe to some extent but have not partici-
pated
16.3
Believe but have not participated  5.7
Believe and have participated  3.7
Other responses  1.7
Total 100.0
Source: Le and Jiang 1998: 75. 
Notes: The respondents totalled 619. The surveyors defined superstitions (folk religions) as physi-
ognomy, fortune telling, worshipping deities for help, divining, and believing in lucky numbers.
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Deng's Southern Tour in 1992. Rampant corruption has further under-
mined the offi cial ideology, with an increasing number of people turning 
to religion for an alternative set of beliefs to fi ll the spiritual vacuum.17
Third, religion meets the population's needs for psychological 
comfort and spiritual fulfi lment, especially in confronting a variety of 
problems inherent in the modernization program, including increasing 
marketization, rapid social transition, and emerging social problems. 
A large body of literature on modernization suggests that this process 
could transform and disrupt the existing class structure, ethnic and 
tribal relations, political power structure, and even the values system. 
Modernization in several Western countries and many non-Western 
countries was accompanied by social disruption, political upheavals, 
protest, revolution, and even large-scale wars. These examples included 
the civil wars in Great Britain, the United States, Russia, and China as 
well as numerous coups and armed movements in Africa and Latin 
America. Modernization also gives rise to deviant social behaviour and 
leads to the breakdown of traditional values and ethics. 18
In a similar vein, recent economic and social changes in China since 
the late 1970s have created considerable social stresses and ruptures. 
Millions are dislocated socially and economically; many have been laid 
off and hence are experiencing a loss of social safety and security (in-
cluding free health-care and guaranteed income); rural income grows 
sluggishly; and rural workers face discrimination in the cities. Alienation 
in the form of loneliness and helplessness in an increasingly competi-
tive world, together with the prevalent social anomie, as evidence in 
money-worship, prostitution, and the breakup of families and family 
values, are taking their toll on the people. Religion, on the other hand, 
provides spiritual peace to a population troubled and disillusioned with 
present-day social and political turmoil. This is just as signifi cant as the 
lessening of state prohibition in explaining the religious revival.
Fourth, religious infl uence survived even the Cultural Revolution. Dur-
ing the Cultural Revolution the infl uence of religion abated yet persisted, 
especially in the countryside. Religions, such as Buddhism, exercise their 
subtle infl uence on people through literature, art, philosophy and family 
(MacInnis 1989: 155-63; Hunter and Chan 1993: 168-75). These residues 
of religious beliefs can be rekindled once conditions are favourable.
Fifth, not only the Chinese cultural traditions but also the state shape 
the revival of religions. On the one hand, religious revival refl ects the 
resilience of the traditional culture. Many Chinese Catholics maintained 
their faith during the Cultural Revolution because the Church upheld 
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their bonds to kin and ancestors, which is an important traditional Chi-
nese value. On the other hand, as a result of the state's past efforts to 
eliminate religion, some popular religious rituals today are modifi ed 
traditional elements that differed from those before the Communist 
reign, or are merely cultural fragments (Madsen 1989; Siu 1989).
Han Buddhist and Daoist Utilitarian Belief 
The studies on China's religious revival cited above also touch on factors 
that motivate individual Chinese to turn to religion. However, they are 
not based on any comprehensive survey. In this article, I proceed via 
a different approach, by examining the results of the aforementioned 
survey on Buddhists and Daoists in Hubei (see Table 7) and drawing 
conclusions. Respondents were allowed to choose multiple causes for 
turning to religions.
From the survey, we can see a utilitarian tendency in the Han Chinese 
religious belief. The largest portion (51.6 percent) of believers turned to 
religion out of a hope that the divine would bring them material benefi ts. 
Specifi cally, 36 percent sought prosperity, 9.4 percent wanted material 
well-being, 6.2 percent hoped to obtain medical cure or relief through 
their religious beliefs. That is to say, the Han Buddhists and Daoists ac-
cept religion hoping that supernatural forces would bring them material 
benefi ts in their mortal lives (Hou and Fan 1994: 9-10, 86-129; Gao 1994: 
332; Xu Shaoqiang, cf. Hunter and Chan 1993: 174). Only 30 percent of the 
believers sought spiritual guidance from religion, 9.8 percent reported 
an intellectual fascination with religion, and about one-fi fth turned to 
religion out of their political and social discontent. A number of the 
respondents accepted religion because of family infl uence. 
As discussed, recent political, economic, and social changes in China, 
such as unemployment, losses of social security and medical care, cor-
ruption, money-worship, prostitution, and the breakup of families, may 
have contributed to religious conversion. Surprisingly, only 1.5 percent 
of the respondents reported a loss of confi dence in the CCP and social-
ism, probably out of the political sensitivity of the choice. Nevertheless, 
religious conversion signals the offi cial ideology's declining appeal.
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Conclusion
In China today three categories of religion exist: (i) offi cial religions, 
namely, Buddhism, Daoism (Taoism), Islam, Protestantism and Catholi-
cism, represented by offi cial associations and approved monasteries; (ii) 
unoffi cial religions that operate without the state's permission, including 
underground Catholic and Protestant churches, unoffi cial sects (such 
as Falun Gong), and pro-independence Tibetan Buddhists and Xinjiang 
Muslims; (iii) folk religions of various forms, whose practitioners are 
usually not well organized. All the above three categories of religion 
expanded rapidly in the post-Mao period. 
Religious revival in China is driven by the state's abandonment of 
Mao's ban on religion, a decline in the appeal of the offi cial ideology, and 
the populace's inherent psychological needs for security amidst rapid 
modernization, increasing commercialization and social dislocation. 
More importantly, religious revival raises questions about the future of 
religions in China as well as the state's policy towards religion.  
Reasons %
1. To seek prosperity and material well-being 51.6
• Escape poverty and seek prosperity 36.0
• Seek material well-being in this life  9.4
• Seek remedy for and escape serious illness  6.2
2. To have spiritual sustenance 29.7
• Disillusioned with and escape from the mate-
rial world
 5.9
• Seek happiness in an afterlife  9.8
• Hope divinity would grant wisdom  7.0
• Hope the soul would be purifi ed  7.0
3. Driven by political and social discontent 20.5
• Dissatisfi ed with corruption, social evil, and 
social inequality
19.0
• Losing confi dence in the CCP and socialism  1.5
4. To seek knowledge (and fascinated by theologies)  9.8
5. Infl uenced by a religious family Unknown
TABLE 7: Reasons Hubei Residents Gave for Believing in Buddhism 
and Daoism, 1997
Source: Gong and Zhou 1999: 72. I regroup the subcategories under more appropriate categories.
The survey allowed the respondents to choose more than 1 answer 
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Indeed, in today's China, modernization and commercialization are 
no substitute for religion (Luo 2000: 407-17). In fact, China's economic 
reform has generated much insecurity and anxiety among its peoples, 
whereby individuals feel a deep sense of alienation from society and a 
considerable number of people stoically endure physical suffering be-
cause formerly affordable public health-care services have been disman-
tled. Religion thus provides mental solace and spiritual fulfi lment. 
However, except perhaps for ethnic minorities (especially those in 
Tibet and Xinjiang), the Han Chinese, at least Buddhists and Daoists who 
make up the majority of religious believers, have been materialistic and 
practical in outlook. The Han Chinese will continue to turn to religion 
primarily hoping for improvement in their mortal lives, and secondarily 
for their afterlives, but seldom for the administration of the state or to 
exact revenge on foreign enemies, as do fundamentalists in the Mid-
dle East, South and Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. For Tibetans and 
Uighurs, however, religion is ingrained in their culture and tradition, 
and it is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future.
Hongyi Harry Lai is Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University 
of Singapore.
NOTES
1   For recent US media coverage of China's religions, see New York Times 19, 20 May 
2001; Time 2001: 18-24; Xiao 1999: 33.
2   This defi nition is a modifi ed version of that used by Marshall 1998: 562.
3   For historical studies of Chinese religions, refer to Jochim 1986; Ching 1993; Wolf 1974; 
Gao 1994. For contemporary studies, see MacInnis 1989; Madsen 1998.
4   See Daniel Overmyer's explanation for excluding Confucianism (Overmyer 2003: 
315). As Overmyer argues, Confucianism might have infl uenced the veneration of 
ancestors. However, ancestral worship can be traced back to the state's practice under 
the Zhou dynasty prior to Confucius. Confucianism only reinforces this tradition. 
See 'The Origin of Kanyu,' 2003.
5   For studies of folk religions, see Gao 1994: 330-55 and MacInnis 1989: 367-74, 385-410; 
Dean 1993; Siu 1989: 121-37; for anthropological studies, refer to essays in Faure and 
Siu 1995; for a historical study, see Feuchtwang 2001.
6   These comments apply to the articles in The China Quarterly 174. (June 2003)
7   For sources of Chinese offi cials statistics, refer to sources for Table 2 and Gong 1998: 
24.  Two facts also are woth noting. First, the majority of Tibetans believe in Tibetan 
Buddhism. Second, Islam is an accepted faith among 10 minorities, including Hui, 
Uygurs, Kazak, Dongxiang, Kirgiz, Salar, Tajik, Uzbek, Bonan and Tatar.
8   The number of believers in religions might have reached the lowest point shortly after 
1966. Protestantism might be an exception in the 1980s, because its popularity grew rapidly 
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with China's opening to the West and the Chinese fascination with the Western culture. 
9   Although William Liu (2000: 120) disputes this view, Li did claim himself as a propa-
gator of the true Dharma before the last millennium in his much-publicized Zhuan 
falun (Li 1994: 33, 11). 
10   For an inside look at the Chinese leaders' crackdown on Falun Gong, refer to Zong 
2001: 47-70.
11   For a discussion of religion and culture in Tibet, refer to Kvaerne 2002 and Grunfeld 
1996. For overviews of Uighur religion, culture and history, refer to Lapidus 2002: 
351-55, 725-31, and Rossabi 2002: 355-73. Arguably, ordinary Tibetan Buddhists and 
Muslims in Xinjiang are vague and silent about their position toward independence of 
their own ethnic regions. Vocal separatists may use their religious background to mo-
bilize support and organize protests, resistance movements, and even violent acts.
12    For further discussion on religious or religious-inspired movements in Tibet and 
Xinjiang and Beijing's responses, refer to Lai 2003.
13    For historical studies on folk religions, see Feuchtwang 2001; for case studies, refer 
to Faure and Siu 1995; Faure 1986.
14    For further analyses of Chinese folk religions in post-Mao China, refer to Feuchtwang 2001.
15   Gong is Professor at the Department of Religious Studies, College of Philosophy, 
Wuhan University, and Zhou is a Deputy Secretary General of the Standing Com-
mittee of the People's Congress of Hubei Province. They have good access to internal 
data on religious followers in Hubei.
16   For detailed discussion on the logic of state's policies toward different religions, 
refer to Lye 2002.
17   For discussion on the spiritual crisis, refer to Madsen 1998: 8-11 and Wong 1999: 5.
18   For classical studies of revolutions and civil wars in countries experiencing or in the 
process of modernization, refer to Moore 1966 and Skocpol 1979. For discussion of 
effects of modernization on the political structure, refer to Huntington 1968. For so-
ciological discussion on modernization, see Parsons 1959. For a discussion on social 
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